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Thurman Arnold, who headed the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice from 1938 to 1943, is a legend in the field of antitrust. Yale, where he once
taught (though not antitrust), has an interdisciplinary antitrust project named
after him.1 His record as head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division
has served as a guiding light for those who have followed in his footsteps and led
that Division.2 Even practitioners across the country and around the world who
do not specialize in antitrust are likely to be familiar with the elite firm that he
founded and that bears his name, Arnold & Porter.3
“History never repeats itself,” Mark Twain wrote, “but the Kaleidoscopic
combinations of the pictured present often seem to be constructed out of the

* Assistant Professor of Law & Director of International Human Rights Clinic, University
of Wyoming College of Law; Stanford University School of Law, J.D., 1990; Princeton University,
B.A., summa cum laude, 1983. The author served as special litigation counsel in the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice from 1993–1995. This essay is written in honor of Anne
K. Bingaman (Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 1993–1996), who embodied the spirit of
Thurman Arnold on every day of her tenure in the position that he once held.
1
Thurman Arnold Project at Yale, Yale School of Management, som.yale.edu/facultyresearch-centers/centers-initiatives/thurman-arnold-project-at-yale (last visited Apr. 19, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/B6TT-GKG3].
2

Spencer Weber Waller, Thurman Arnold: A Biography 110 (2005).

See Arnold & Porter, www.arnoldporter.com/en/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) [https://perma.
cc/4NDE-65WL].
3
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broken fragments of antique legends.”4 Arnold’s intellectual worldview was
shaped by a world much different from today’s, but the broken fragments of it
can be glimpsed in the present. He had seen the breathtaking destructiveness of
World War I, joined as it was with propaganda that tried to cloak the slaughter in
meaning. He experienced the oppressive economic colonialism that sapped places
like his hometown, Laramie, of opportunity. And he witnessed the collapse of
capitalist economies accompanied by the rise of totalitarian mass movements that
depended on creating and imposing their own alternative ideological realities.
He took the helm of the Antitrust Division at a time when the nation’s economic system was in deep crisis and antitrust enforcement largely had been
sidelined for decades.
Today, the United States is mired in conflicts abroad that began when
many current law students had not yet started kindergarten. Additionally, the
rise of China’s authoritarian capitalism is challenging U.S. influence and liberal
democracy. The Great Recession of 2008 shook public faith in the economic
system, while persistent and growing income inequality and the vast power of
a few large tech firms lead some to question the viability of the system. There
seems to be a widening gap between places with economic opportunity and
those without.5
Not unconnected to these broader developments, an “intellectual contest
over the soul of antitrust” is raging.6 So now is a good time to revisit Thurman
Arnold’s story and his influence on antitrust. The Centennial issue of the
Wyoming Law Review is an appropriate place to do so: before he strode onto the
stage of history as the nation’s chief “trust buster,” Thurman Arnold was born and
raised in Laramie and played an important role in founding the University of
Wyoming College of Law.

Mark Twain & Charles Dudley Warren, The Gilded Age: A Tale of To-Day, reprinted in
Mark Twain, The Gilded Age and Later Novels 343 (Hamlin L. Hill ed., Library of America
2002) (1874). The pithier “History never repeats itself, but it rhymes” is often attributed to Twain.
The passage in The Gilded Age was presented as the lede of an overwrought newspaper’s coverage of
a scandalous murder case.
4

See, e.g., Phillip Longman, Why the Economic Fates of America’s Cities Diverged, Atl.
Monthly (Nov. 28, 2015), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/cities-economic-fatesdiverge/417372/ [https://perma.cc/53KQ-MC2F].
5

A. Douglas Melamed et al., Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation: Cases and
Materials 59 (7th ed. 2018). Compare, e.g., Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s
Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. Euro. Competition L. & Prac. 131 (2018), with Carl Shapiro, Antitrust
in a Time of Populism, 61 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 714 (2018). See generally What More Should Antitrust
Be Doing?, The Economist (Aug. 8, 2020), www.economist.com/schools-brief/2020/08/06/whatmore-should-antitrust-be-doing [https://perma.cc/3BGW-F9ZA].
6
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I. “That Man from Laramie” 7
Thurman Arnold contained multitudes.8 He “was an original” who “was too
large and interesting a man to be encapsulated in a few paragraphs.”9 He was
compared at various times and by various people to Rabelais10 and Voltaire11;
Machiavelli,12 Marx—both Karl13 and Groucho,14 Jeremy Bentham and Charles
Darwin;15 W.C Fields and H.L Mencken;16 Thorstein Veblen;17 Jonathan Swift,
Montesquieu, and Friedrich Nietzsche.18 He was an outsider19 and an insider;20 a
small-town lawyer and politician;21 a soldier, a law school dean, and professor; a
bestselling author; a top official in the federal government; a federal judge; and a
founder of one of the top law firms in the nation. He was an iconoclast,22 but not

Gene M. Gressley, Preface to Voltaire and the Cowboy: The Letters of Thurman
Arnold xiv (Gene M. Gressley ed., 1977) [hereinafter Voltaire and the Cowboy].
7

8
See Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, 51, Poets.org, poets.org/poem/song-myself-51 (last
visited Apr. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GQ9F-4M4E] (“Do I contradict myself?/Very well then I
contradict myself,/(I am large, I contain multitudes.)”); see also Bob Dylan, I Contain Multitudes,
on Rough and Rowdy Ways (Columbia 2020), www.bobdylan.com/songs/i-contain-multitudes/
[https://perma.cc/RJ2C-UZR6] (“I’m a man of contradictions and a man of many moods . . . I
contain multitudes”).
9

Edward H. Levi, Thurman Arnold, 79 Yale L.J. 983, 983 (1970).

Gene M. Gressley, Mr. Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the Progressive Heritage, in The
Twentieth-Century American West: A Potpourri 164, 169–70 (1977) (quoting Joseph Alsop
& Robert D. Kinter, Trust Buster –The Folklore of Thurman Arnold, Saturday Evening Post 5 (Aug.
12, 1939)); see also The Twentieth-Century American West: A Potpourri, supra, at 22.
10

11
The Twentieth-Century American West: A Potpourri, supra note 10, at 34 (quoting
Robert Jackson). See also Gressley, supra note 7, at xiv (“Jackson’s[] description of Arnold[] as ‘a cross
between Voltaire and the cowboy, with the cowboy predominating’ . . . is the most graphic, and
perhaps accurate, one-phrase representation of ” Arnold.).
12

Max Lerner, The Shadow World of Thurman Arnold, 47 Yale L.J. 687, 687 (1938).

13

Id.

14

Waller, supra note 2, at 77.

15

Lerner, supra note 12, at 687.

16

Waller, supra note 2, at 76–77.

17

Id.; see also Lerner, supra note 12, at 587.

18

Lerner, supra note 12, at 688.

See Thurman W. Arnold, Fair Fights and Foul: A Dissenting Lawyer’s Life 16
(1965) (recalling that his “Western clothes, mannerisms, and speech did not fit [at Princeton and
he] was immediately classified as a queer character”).
19

Waller, supra note 2, at 181 (recounting the celebrations of Arnold’s seventieth birthday,
including that “Vice-President Johnson invited him to the White House for a celebration”).
20

21

See Gene M. Gressley, Introduction to Voltaire and the Cowboy, supra note 7, at 18–23.

22

Gressley, supra note 10, at 170.
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a revolutionary.23 He was the philosopher of middle-class radicalism.24 He was a
noted civil libertarian25 whose writings seemed, to some, to include “dangerous
totalitarian tendencies.”26 He became a celebrated public intellectual by satirizing
the antitrust laws the year before he was put in charge of enforcing those very
laws. He was, in short, “a personality of marvelous incongruities.”27
Thurman Arnold was a child of the West, born in Laramie in 1891, the year
after Wyoming became a state.28 In his late teens, he went east to study, first to
Wabash College, which he hated, then to Princeton University. Though he made
it through Princeton with flying colors, what stuck with him were feelings of
alienation and boredom. He felt out of place because of his Western ways and
recalled near the end of his life that “my years at Princeton were chiefly remarkable
for their loneliness.”29 After attending law school at Harvard, he headed back west
to Chicago. There he made a go at practicing law. That effort was interrupted by
a stint in the military, which took him first to Texas and Mexico in pursuit of
Pancho Villa, then to France for a cameo in World War I.
After the war, Arnold returned to Laramie, settling down to practice law
with his father. Not long after returning, he began pushing the state bar association
to establish a law school at the University of Wyoming.30 The bar association
did not act but the University’s governing board did, and the College of Law
admitted its first class in September 1920. Arnold taught at the new school and
allowed the students to use his law library. He continued agitating for state bar
support, emphasizing the importance of having Wyoming lawyers who were
educated in Wyoming.31
He also entered politics, serving a single term as the lone Democrat in the
Wyoming House, then eking out a victory to become mayor of Laramie. As his

Alan Brinkley, The Antimonopoly Ideal and the Liberal State: The Case of Thurman Arnold,
80 J. Am. Hist. 557, 558 (1993) (“Arnold was an iconoclast who stopped well short of being
a revolutionary.”).
23

24

Lerner, supra note 12, at 701.

25

See Waller, supra note 2, at 130–50.

Edward N. Kearny, Thurman Arnold, Social Critic: The Satirical Challenge to
Orthodoxy 4 (1970).
26

27

Introduction to Voltaire and the Cowboy, supra note 7, at 93.

Those interested in learning about Arnold’s life are fortunate that he has had two attentive
and sympathetic biographers. See generally Introduction to Voltaire and the Cowboy, supra note
7; Waller, supra note 2. This brief account of his life is drawn from their work, except as noted.
28

29

Arnold, supra note 19, at 16.

See Michael Golden, History of the University of Wyoming College of Law: The First SeventyFive Years, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 2 (1996); see also Douglas Ayer, In Quest of Efficiency: The
Ideological Journey of Thurman Arnold, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1058 & n.41 (1971).
30

31

See Golden, supra note 30, at 3.
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mayoral term came to an end, he was defeated in his bid for county prosecutor.
With dim political prospects and frustrated by the limitations that Laramie’s
moribund economy imposed on the prospect of an interesting legal practice,
Arnold jumped at an offer to be dean of the law school at West Virginia University.
He never lived in Laramie again, and one imagines that he never regretted the
professional consequences of leaving. But looking back many years later, he still
remembered how his wife wept as they drove out of town and “how we hated
to leave that wonderful combination of rolling plains and blue, snow-capped
mountains that we knew as Wyoming!”32
His time in West Virginia was relatively brief, ending when he joined the
faculty at Yale Law School. His Yale years were productive as he taught, published
as part of the burgeoning legal realist movement, and worked summers and during
a sabbatical for the Roosevelt Administration. Certainly well regarded by 1937,
Arnold rose to a new level of national prominence with the publication of a book
called The Folklore of Capitalism.33

II. The Perils of Satire
The Folklore of Capitalism became a best seller and certified Arnold as a
public intellectual. As his biographer, Spencer Weber Waller, noted, it was a book
that “the ‘chattering class’ read and discussed.”34 This success was a little odd,
because the point of Folklore was rather opaque. Introducing Arnold at a speaking
event shortly after it was published, lawyer-businessman (and eventual 1940
Republican presidential nominee) Wendell Willkie commented that he had read
Folklore three times, which no doubt filled Arnold with pride. “But,” Willkie then
explained, “I have yet to understand what Mr. Arnold is driving at.”35
However opaque the book as a whole, it appeared that Arnold held the
antitrust laws in low regard. Arnold’s idea broadly was that politicians and
political programs must fit into a prevailing folklore or mythology. This becomes
a problem in times of rapid change or dislocation, such as the 1930s, when a
gap develops between folklore and reality. As Arnold himself explained in a
preface to the 1962 reprint of the book, he sought to “describe the frustrating
effects, in times of revolutionary change, of ideals and symbols inherited from a
different past.”36

32

Arnold, supra note 19, at 35.

33

Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (Greenwood Press 1980) (1937).

34

Waller, supra note 2, at 76.

Gressley, supra note 10, at 170 n.16 (quoting Shelby Cullum Davis, The Bottlenecks of
Business, Atl. Monthly, Nov. 1940, at 560).
35

36

Arnold, supra note 33, at iii.
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Antitrust was an area, Arnold believed, where folklore and reality had
diverged. The persistent folklore was that the American economy comprised
individuals competing with each other. One corollary of this folklore was that
corporations, no matter how large, were “personified” and treated as though they
were individuals, even to the point where the folklore insisted that government
regulation of business was the equivalent of—and as suspect as—government
regulation of individuals. Another corollary of the ingrained assumption of
competing individuals (or “small competing concerns which, if they were not
individuals, nevertheless approach[ed] that ideal”) is that “‘[b]igness’ was regarded
as a curse because it led to monopoly and interfered with the operation of the laws
of supply and demand.”37
The divergence of folklore and reality, of course, was that the American
economy of the 1930s had long since ceased to be primarily composed of
competing individuals or small enterprises. Moreover, and equally important,
large corporations had arisen for a very important practical reason: economies of
scale resulted in higher output and lower prices.38 The way that society resolved
the contradiction between the folklore and the reality, in Arnold’s conception,
was by creating a quasi-religious ceremony through which big corporations could
be denounced but not obstructed. The need for this ceremony “gave rise to the
antitrust laws which appeared to be a complete prohibition of large combinations . . . [but] made the enforcement of the antitrust laws a pure ritual.”39
Arnold likened advocates for antitrust enforcement to preachers inveighing
against vice. Actual success is neither possible, nor even the point:
[N]o preacher ever succeeded in abolishing any form of sin.
Had there been no conflict—had society been able to operate in
an era of growing specialization without these organizations—
it would have been easy enough to kill them by practical
means. . . . Since the organizations were demanded, attempts
to stop their growth necessarily became purely ceremonial. . . .
The antitrust laws, being a preaching device, naturally performed
only the functions of preaching.40
Antitrust campaigns “always ended with a ceremony of atonement, but few
practical results.”41 The lack of practical results was a direct consequence of the
37

Id. at 206.

Id. (noting that “specialized techniques made bigness essential to producing goods in large
enough quantities and at a price low enough so that they could be made part of the American
standard of living”).
38

39

Id. at 206– 07.

40

Id. at 211–12.

41

Id. at 220.
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“moral attitude” of advocates, who “thought in Utopias.”42 For these advocates,
“[p]hilosophy was . . . more important than opportunism and so they achieved in
the end philosophy rather than opportunity.”43
As throughout Folklore, Arnold’s analysis of the antitrust laws and their
implementation is replete with analogy and metaphor: “Thus antitrust laws
became popular moral gestures and their economic meaninglessness never quite
penetrated the thick priestly incense which hung over the nation like a pillar
of fire by night and a cloud of smoke by day.”44
Arnold did not stop, however, at asserting that the antitrust laws were
ineffective in dismantling large companies. They actually, he argued, “became
the greatest protection to uncontrolled business dictatorships.”45 Any proposal to
regulate big business “broke to pieces on the great protective rock of the antitrust
laws,”46 because those laws were invoked as the proper recourse for any problems
associated with corporate activity. And who was doing the invoking? Well,
according to Arnold, it was liberals, whose vision, in effect, was obscured by the
priestly incense he had described. And, in a passage that would soon come back
to haunt him, he said it was not just any liberals, but “[m]en like Senator Borah
[who] founded political careers on the continuance of such [antitrust] crusades,
which were entirely futile but enormously picturesque, and which paid big
dividends in terms of political prestige.”47
The Senator that Arnold called out by name was Senator William Borah,
a progressive Republican from Idaho.48 His criticism of Borah was particularly
ill-considered, as the next year the Senator was a member of the subcommittee
considering Arnold’s nomination to be the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division. One can only imagine the difficulties that Arnold
would have created for himself if he had had access to Twitter.49
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 96.

45

Id. at 214 (emphasis added).

46

Id. at 215.

47

Id. at 217.

Borah served in the Senate from 1907 to his death in 1940. Although he was often at odds
with the Republican Party in his state, he was regularly re-elected with huge margins. See Claudius
Johnson, William E. Borah: The People’s Choice, 44 Pac. Nw. Q. 15 (1953); see generally LeRoy
Ashby, The Spearless Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s
(1972).
48

49
Cf. Jennifer Scholtes & Caitlin Emma, Tanden Pays for Belittling Bernie, Politico (Feb.
10, 2021), www.politico.com/news/2021/02/10/sander-tanden-confirmation-468350 [https://
perma.cc/3DV6-L2PD] (“[OMB nominee] Neera Tanden’s ruthless tweets continued to haunt her
confirmation process Wednesday as she faced the scorn of Senate Budget Chair Bernie Sanders,
another target of her public criticism.”).
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Anyone who read Folklore could be forgiven for concluding that Thurman
Arnold found little worth in the antitrust laws, that he considered them the creed
of a religion in which he did not believe. And such a reader would have found it
odd, if not shocking, that less than a year after the publication of Folklore, Arnold
was nominated by Franklin Roosevelt to be in charge of enforcing those very
laws.50 Indeed, the nomination provoked “howls of holy horror,”51 and the press
reproduced “succulent excerpts” from Folklore.52
Not surprisingly, Arnold prepared a response, and it was what any clever
lawyer—which he certainly was—would say: “My answer, of course, was to be
that in writing that book I was merely an observer of what the antitrust laws had
been during the period of great mergers in the 1920’s. It would all be different
once I was in office.”53As for his criticism of Borah, Arnold’s “only hope was
that he was too busy and important a man to read such trivia as The Folklore of
Capitalism.”54 As the hearing started, though, he saw to his consternation that
Borah “conspicuously displayed . . . a copy of ” the book.55
Borah pressed Arnold strongly on things that Arnold had said in the
book, although (to Arnold’s relief ) he skipped over the ad hominem attacks.56
As he had planned, Arnold stuck doggedly to the explanation that his point
of view in the book was that of an observer “describing what has happened.”57
Somewhat more colorfully, he described his approach as “that of a dissector in
the laboratory.”58

See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in The
Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays 188, 191 (Phoenix ed. 1979) (1965)
(“The very appointment of Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division--a man whose
books had effectively ridiculed the antitrust laws as a facade behind which the concentration of
American industry could go on unimpeded--seemed to underline perfectly the whole comedy of
the antitrust enterprise.”).
50

Wilson D. Miscamble, Thurman Arnold Goes to Washington: A Look at Antitrust Policy in
the Later New Deal, 56 Bus. Hist. Rev. 1, 7 (1982) (quoting Fred Rodell, Arnold: Myth and Trust
Buster, The New Republic, June 22, 1938, at 177–78).
51

Lerner, supra note 12, at 700; see also Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of
Thurman Arnold, 78 St. John’s L. Rev. 569, 574–75 (2004); Brinkley, supra note 24, at 564.
52

53

Arnold, supra note 19, at 136.

54

Id. at 137.

55

Id.

56

See id.

Nomination of Thurman W. Arnold: Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm. on the Nomination of
Thurman W. Arnold of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 6 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings];
see generally id. at 4–10 (Arnold stating eleven times that Folklore was merely a description of
“what happened”).
57

58

Id. at 7.
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Arnold’s friend and the chair of the subcommittee, Wyoming Senator
Joseph O’Mahoney, seemed mildly horrified by the image Arnold presented of
himself dissecting capitalism and rushed to throw the witness a lifeline. “I think
you ought to develop that phrase, Thurman,” the Chairman interceded. “[T]oo
many people who have read your book have thought you are a ‘dissector.’ That is
probably the cause of the criticisms which have been directed against you.”59
Arnold did not at first take the hint, and soon was opining that he did
“not think that the anatomical chart which you get out of that process with first
the skin and finally the bones makes a good picture to hang in the library.”60
Maybe realizing that this analogy was less than effective, he concluded that the
“point of view is a little difficult to state because it is not a usual one.”61 Borah
then helped Arnold out by offering him a chance to affirm that Folklore was
“simply your preparation for a real attack upon monopolies and trust” and to
disavow any intent to defend or apologize for them, which Arnold dutifully did.62
Max Lerner, the editor of The Nation and not an unsympathetic observer,63
commented that:
[T]he temper of Arnold’s replies to Borah was not quite the
temper of the book. There was more restraint in it, less joyousness,
less certitude, less of the sharp quality of the dissecting room.
The moral, of course, is that you don’t take your dissecting
instruments into the Senate chamber—it would clutter up the
place and get in the way of the Senators.64
More substantively, Lerner was not persuaded by Arnold’s explanations.
He worried that winning confirmation was, for Arnold, “a Pyrrhic victory” that
required him to leave “his theory behind on the field of battle.”65
But did it? It may very well be that Arnold simply changed his view of the
value of the antitrust laws once enforcing them became his job. He would not
have been the first person in Washington, and certainly not the last, whose
stand shifted based on where he sat. It is also possible, however, to accept at face

59

Id.

60

Id. at 7–8.

61

Id. at 8.

Id. at 8; see also id. at 3 (“I think that the enforcement of the antitrust laws should be
vigorous and that it should be fair.”).
62

Arnold had tried unsuccessfully to get Lerner a faculty position at Yale a few years earlier.
See Waller, supra note 2, at 63.
63

64

Lerner, supra note 12, at 701.

65

Id. at 700.
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value the explanation that Arnold offered to Senator Borah and his colleagues.
It is, in fact, one thing to be an observer describing what has happened with the
dispassion of a dissector—and an academic to boot—and quite another to have
the responsibility actually to do something. To use a different metaphor, Folklore
(and Arnold’s previous book, The Symbols of Government 66) was about tipping
over sacred cows, not providing instructions for running the ranch.67
No doubt, Arnold had a penchant for getting carried away in his dissecting,
sometimes wielding more of a machete than a scalpel.68 In fact, he realized as
much, writing Borah a letter after he had been confirmed to apologize for what
he had said about the Senator in Folklore.69 But he again reaffirmed his belief
in Folklore’s basic analysis of how the antitrust laws had been implemented to
that point and presaged his program for the next five years: “[E]ven though the
antitrust laws, as at present administered, may be imperfect, it would be fatal
not to do the utmost we can with them since that is the only instrument we have.
I doubt, therefore, if there is any real disagreement between us.”70
More telling is an essay that Arnold published in the New York Times Sunday
Magazine a few months after he took office explaining the necessity of the
enforcement program the government was embarking upon.71 He reprised—in
much more digestible form—many of the arguments (and analogies) he had
made in Folklore.72 In particular, he argued that “forty years of ritualistic anti-trust
Thurman W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government xiii (Harcourt, Brace & World
1962) (1935).
66

See Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. 317 (Vintage
1960) (1955) (though Arnold’s target in Folklore and Symbols was “largely . . . the ritualistic thinking
of the conservatives of the 1930s, [they] might stand equally well as an attack upon that moralism
which we found so insistent in the thinking of Progressivism”); see generally Kearny, supra note 26.
67

68
See Kearny, supra note 26, at 4 (Arnold’s “books are highlighted by a series of dramatic overstatements.”).
69
Letter from Thurman Arnold to Senator William Borah, in Voltaire and the Cowboy,
supra note 7, at 268 (expressing Arnold’s “extreme regret at the reference to yourself in my book”).
70

Id. at 269.

Thurman Arnold, An Inquiry into the Monopoly Issue, N.Y. Times Sunday Mag. 1 (Aug.
21, 1938), www.nytimes.com/1938/08/21/archives/an-inquiry-into-the-monopoly-issue-thurmanarnold-holds-that.html. He had been making the same case consistently and in any forum he
could find since he took office. See, e.g., Thurman Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Antitrust
Procedure, 72 U.S. L. Rev. 277 (1938) (text of address to the Trade and Commerce Bar Association
of New York making many of the same points as and using similar language to the Times essay);
see also Waller, supra note 52, at 581 (“Arnold was relentless in promoting himself, his vision for
antitrust, the work of the Antitrust Division, and the need for ever greater resources, staffing,
and budgets.”).
71

72
Compare, e.g., Arnold, supra note 71, at 1 (“The situation is similar to that in the days of
prohibition when men wanted liquor and moral observance of the prohibition law at the same
time.”), with Arnold, supra note 33, at 152 (The public “wanted the nation moral and dry in
principle and at the same time wet in fact.”).
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enforcement . . . has preserved the [anti-monopoly] ideal while at the same time
it permitted sub rosa acquiescence in industrial empire building.”73 With an eye
to his bureaucratic interests as well as practical reality, Arnold argued that the low
level of resources devoted to enforcing the laws illustrated the lack of commitment to actual enforcement.74 He noted that even as Theodore Roosevelt was
gaining fame as a trust buster, the sum total of antitrust enforcement staff was
only nine people.75
Another idea borrowed from Folklore that Arnold deployed in his Times
essay was to characterize high prices charged by monopolies and cartels as a
form of taxation.76 “The power of great organizations to levy what are in effect
taxes is commonplace,” he argued.77 Highly concentrated industries, devoid of
competition, keep prices high and output low and lay off workers.78 Echoing
his criticism in Folklore of focusing on “the curse of bigness,” Arnold explained
that the “answer is not a question of breaking up large businesses into small ones
regardless of their efficiency,” which “is neither the ideal of the policy of the
Sherman Act nor should it be the ideal of further anti-monopoly legislation.”79
Rather, the policy would be “to condemn combinations going beyond efficient
mass production which have become instruments arbitrarily affixing inflexible
prices or exercising coercive power.”80
Other than its focus on high prices as a form of tax and the disavowal of
breaking up large businesses solely because of their size, the Times essay was
rather vague on the details of the new enforcement policy. Arnold attributed
this to the understandable need to take each situation on its own terms. Thus,
he promised that public statements of explanation would accompany his
division’s enforcement decisions as a means of making clear the underlying

73

Arnold, supra note 71, at 1.

Id. at 2 (“Nothing can be more indicative of the purely ritualistic enforcement of the
anti-trust laws than the size of the personnel devoted to enforcing them.”). He was not saying
that the enforcers were small, but that there were not enough of them. One of his immediate
priorities, which he succeeded in achieving, was vastly increasing the size of the Antitrust Division.
See Arnold, supra note 19, at 113–14; Waller, supra note 2, at 87 (noting that the Division grew
from 18 employees before Arnold took over to a peak during his tenure of almost 600, while its
budget increased 400 percent).
74

75

Arnold, supra note 71, at 2.

See Arnold, supra note 33, at 268 (“Men in America were so conditioned that they
felt differently about taxes and about prices. The former was an involuntary taking; the latter a
voluntary giving.”).
76

77

Arnold, supra note 71, at 1.

78

Id. at 14.

79

Id. at 15.

80

Id.
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policy. “Whether this policy is liked by business or not,” he said, “it will at least
be understood.”81
In short, the segue from the academic observer satirizing the record of
antitrust enforcement in Folklore to the nation’s chief trust buster was not as
jarring as generally thought. None of this is to suggest that Arnold was chosen for
the antitrust job because of his ideas for enforcement. It seems much more likely
that his appointment to that particular job had an element of serendipity.82 In
fact, Arnold had earlier been offered a position on the Securities and Exchange
Commission, where he would have served alongside his good friend from Yale,
William O. Douglas. But Yale denied his leave request.83 A few months later,
when he was offered the antitrust position, leave was forthcoming, and a new
chapter in the history of antitrust enforcement began.

III. From Dissector to Enforcer
The scale and scope of Arnold’s record as head of the Antitrust Division has
been well documented and discussed by historians and legal scholars alike.84
Although he disavowed “trust busting for the sake of trust busting,”85 he found
plenty of targets to go after. With Arnold as its chief, the Division filed almost as
many cases as had been brought in the preceding half century. Richard Hofstadter
contended that Arnold’s tenure “mark[ed] the true beginning of effective anti
trust action, . . . a watershed in the history of antitrust jurisprudence.”86 Arnold’s
significance lay not so much in individual cases, although some of the cases he
brought continue to be important precedents.87 Rather, “he showed for the first
time what [the Sherman Act] could and could not do.”88

81

Id. at 15.

See Brinkley, supra note 23, at 563; Miscamble, supra note 51, at 8. One report suggested
that Arnold was the fourth choice for the antitrust slot. Waller, supra note 52, at 574 (citing
Joseph Alsop & Robert Kintner, The Capital Parade, Cummings Seen Losing Control of Justice Agency,
Wash. Star, Mar. 9, 1938).
82

83

Miscamble, supra note 51, at 8.

See, e.g., Waller, supra note 52; Waller, supra note 2, at 78–110; Gressley, supra note
10; Hofstadter, supra note 50; Miscamble, supra note 51; Brinkley, supra note 23; Rudolph
J.R. Peritz, Competition Policy in America, 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law 158–60,
168–71 (1996); Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in
Economic Ambivalence 421–31 (1966); Ayer, supra note 31.
84

Introduction to Voltaire and the Cowboy, supra note 7, at 44 (quoting July 4, 1939,
letter from Arnold to Yale University President Charles Seymour).
85

86

Hofstadter, supra note 50, at 192.

87

E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

Hofstadter, supra note 50, at 232. Hofstadter, though, was not particularly impressed
with what the Sherman Act actually could do: “[I]t is one thing to say that antitrust has at last
begun to fulfill a function, and another to forget how modest that function is.” Id. at 236.
88
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In his magisterial History of Wyoming, Professor T.A. Larson devoted a
paragraph to Arnold’s service as head of the Antitrust Division and his “crusade
against trusts.” 89 Larson was not too impressed with this crusade’s achievements.
Arnold “brought many suits,” Larson damned with faint praise, “and won
several of them.” After citing Arnold’s success in cases involving motion pictures,
Pullman car manufacturing, and cigarettes, he noted that Arnold “failed in cases
involving the more vital problems of medicine, milk, and oil.”90 Then World War
II intervened “before any really spectacular achievements could be produced.”91
One can imagine Arnold in his Washington office receiving a copy of
Larson’s book and, in time honored D.C. tradition, eagerly scanning the index
for mentions of his own name.92 He was not happy with what he read. By his
own account, though, he resolved not to raise the issue with Professor Larson.
The discussion of Arnold’s antitrust record was, after all, merely a paragraph in
a tome of almost 600 pages. And in Arnold’s view, it otherwise was “a hell of a
good book.”93
But as such things go, Arnold could not entirely keep his unhappiness to
himself. So it came to pass that he made “a casual remark at a cocktail party”94
to a mutual acquaintance, and the acquaintance in turn passed it on to Larson,
who for his own part felt the need to write the acquaintance and cite the sources
for his less than positive judgment of Arnold’s trust busting record. In that way,
the whole matter arrived at a point where Arnold felt he had to write directly to
Larson to set the record straight. And in so doing, he provided not just a vigorous
defense of his time at the head of the Antitrust Division, but a clear statement of
his view of the antitrust laws and their purpose.
Arnold began by clarifying that in the areas where Larson said he had failed—
medicine, milk, and oil—“[i]t just so happens that I won all the cases which
reached the Supreme Court in these three fields.”95 He underscored the impact of

89

T.A. Larson, History of Wyoming 450 (1st ed. 1965).

90

Id.

91

Id.

Jennifer 8. Lee, Washington Books Bring Out Index Fingers, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2004, at Sec.
1, p. 38, www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/us/washington-books-bring-out-index-fingers.html (“It is
called ‘the Washington read’ . . . [t]he perusal of a book by checking the index for references, usually
to oneself, and reading only those parts of the book.”).
92

93

at 465.
94

Letter from Thurman Arnold to T.A. Larson, in Voltaire and the Cowboy, supra note 7,
Id. at 461.

Id. at 462. The cases he is referring to presumably include Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); and United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
95
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these decisions and the broader program of enforcement: “The result was a series
of decisions which put a new arsenal of weapons in the hands of the Government. All of these decisions came as a shock to the business community.”96 The
program “changed the rules of the game and created hazards for big business
which did not exist before.”97 The lull in enforcement occasioned by World War
II, Arnold argued, “in no way impaired the long run effect of Roosevelt’s crusade
to restore competition to our economy.”98
Having defended his record in specific areas and the overall record of the
Administration’s policy, Arnold began to hit his stride and turned to the underlying
objectives of the antitrust laws. He assured Larson that
The authorities you quote seem completely ignorant about the
purpose of the Sherman Act. It was never intended to prevent
the growth of great nationwide corporations, nor do I think
in the light of modern industrial techniques that is a desirable
objective. It does not protect small business from what used to
be called ‘ruinous competition’ based on efficiency.99
He allowed that small businesses could be protected from competition by
state fair trade laws, but gloated that such laws protecting small liquor stores
in Wyoming meant that Larson paid more for his whiskey than Arnold did in
Washington. But back to his point about the Sherman Act: “No prosecution was
ever brought based on the size of the defendants alone.”100 The objective of the
antitrust laws was not “to prevent the growth of great industrial empires. . . .
Their only purpose is to see that corporate growth results from efficiency—not
the elimination of competition by aggression or merger.”101 In other words, the
point is “to make great industrial empires behave. This they are doing, since the
war, better than they have ever done before.”102
Arnold utterly rejected any contention, apparently suggested by Larson’s
sources, that the state of antitrust enforcement after World War II somehow
had relapsed into the torpor of the period before 1938. He assured Larson that
Franklin Roosevelt had fundamentally transformed the view of the public and
the judiciary of competition, just as he had fundamentally transformed attitudes

96

Letter from Thurman Arnold to T.A. Larson, supra note 93, at 463.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id.
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toward the proper role of the federal government in addressing social problems.103
Arnold also credited Roosevelt’s competition policy with Europe’s post-war
adoption of antitrust principles.104
Arnold closed with some swipes at economic historians in general and one
named Howard Smith in particular.105 Smith failed to appreciate, Arnold argued,
the significance of the precedent set by Theodore Roosevelt’s pursuit of the
Northern Securities case, which went after a combination of rail lines that threatened
to monopolize railroad traffic in the western United States.106 The government’s
successful prosecution in Northern Securities revived the Sherman Act after it
had suffered a near death experience in an earlier Supreme Court decision that
drastically narrowed its scope.107 Northern Securities, Arnold explained to Larson,
established a precedent that, though not pursued at the time, eventually made
possible the achievements of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration.108
Arnold apologized for having gone on much longer than he intended,
claiming to have been possessed by the “missionary zeal” of his grandfather, who
had been a Presbyterian preacher.109 He offered that if he could “dissuade [Larson]
from reading the kind of superficial economic literature which [he] quote[s], it
may help to preserve [his] integrity as a historian in this world, and save [his]
immortal soul in the next.”110 One doubts whether Larson feared for either his
integrity or his immortal soul. But in the second edition of his book, he omitted
any reference to Arnold’s losing cases or not having spectacular achievements.
Rather, he left things at noting the number of cases Arnold had brought,

103
Whether Roosevelt deserved such credit for Arnold’s enforcement program is debatable.
See Miscamble, supra note 51, at 12–15 (suggesting that FDR’s attitude toward Arnold was more
permissive than supportive and cautioning against the idea that Arnold’s actions reflected Roosevelt’s
views of antitrust).
104

Letter from Thurman Arnold to T.A. Larson, supra note 93, at 464.

See Howard R. Smith, Economic History of the United States 621 (1955)
(“Thurman Arnold set out to take away from Theodore Roosevelt the (scarcely deserved) reputation
of being the nation’s greatest ‘trust buster.’ . . . Taken in all, however, it can legitimately be said
that there were no more long-range consequences of this new attack on the ‘trusts’ than had been
achieved on similar occasions in the past.”).
105

See Letter from Thurman Arnold to T.A. Larson, supra note 93, at 464–65; see N. Sec. Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
106

107

See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

Letter from Thurman Arnold to T.A. Larson, supra note 93, at 465. Arnold believed that
Northern Securities made TR the “real father of the Sherman Act,” because he “took it off the shelf
after ten years of innocuous desuetude as part of his campaign to assert the authority of government
over business.” Arnold, supra note 19, at 120.
108

109

Letter from Thurman Arnold to T.A. Larson, supra note 93, at 465.

110

Id.
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describing some of his victories, and recording that Arnold was famous by the
time World War II curtailed the enforcement program.111
A consistent theme of Arnold’s—articulated in Folklore, his Times essay, his
letter to Professor Larson, and many other places—was that the target of the
antitrust laws is not bigness, but corporate conduct that results in inefficiency
and high prices. While he was antitrust chief, Arnold published The Bottlenecks
of Business,112 which, twenty-five years later, he facetiously recalled “irrefutably
proved that in enforcing the antitrust laws there could be found the complete
solution of all the ills of the Great Depression.”113 In Bottlenecks, Arnold suc
cinctly explained the relationship between competition and enforcement:
[F]ree markets do not maintain themselves. The very essence of
competition consists in getting the better of the other fellow.
Great organizations start by being more efficient. They get into
power. It is inevitable that they will use that power to protect
themselves against the new crop of independent enterprises
which may be pushing them to the wall in the competitive
struggle. A referee is always necessary in the competitive game as
each new enterprise climbs to power.114
The referee, of course, is the government—specifically the Antitrust Division.
An important insight here is that the markets are not necessarily self-governing.
Arnold underscored that the point is refereeing the competition, not the size
of the competitors. He criticized, as he had before, the view that focused on “the
supposed evils of bigness in itself.”115 For one thing, arguing over the merits of
size “is like arguing whether tall buildings are better than low ones. . . . Such
discussions have no meaning in the abstract since the answer depends on the
purposes or functions the organizations are supposed to reform.”116 For another,
a focus on size will deprive antitrust enforcement of public support for the
simple but compelling reason that “[c]onsumers are unwilling to lose the
advantages of a machine age because of sentimental attachment to the ideal of
little business.” 117 Having reiterated his point that bigness itself is not a curse,
Arnold warned that bigness “does give power to those who control it. That

111

T.A. Larson, History of Wyoming 450 (2d ed. rev. 1978).

112

Thurman W. Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business (1940).

113

Arnold, supra note 19, at 120.

114

Arnold, supra note 112, at 121–22.

115

Id. at 122.

116

Id.

117

Id. at 123.
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power must be constantly watched by an adequate enforcement organization to
see that it does not destroy a free market.”118
Arnold’s biographer, Spencer Weber Waller, aptly observed that “Bottlenecks
simply rambled from start to finish . . . [but] was nevertheless captivating.”119 Yet
Arnold’s focus was clear enough. The first sentence explained that “[t]he purpose
of this book is to explain to the consumer what can be done for him to increase the
distribution of goods under our existing law and by pursuing our traditional ideals
of an economy of free and independent enterprise.”120 In the first two paragraphs,
he referred to the American consumer no fewer than eight times. Throughout the
book, he retailed accounts of cases that lowered prices for consumers.121 He once
again looked back to the first forty years of the Sherman Act and explained that
“[a]ntitrust enforcement, not being geared to the idea of consumers’ interests,
became a hunt for offenders instead of ” working to promote “the flow of goods
in commerce”122—that is, promoting maximum output. He boldly proclaimed
that “[i]f the American consumer can be made to understand what the antitrust
laws can do for him, the next few years of the Sherman Act will be an era of
constructive achievement.”123 Somewhat ahead of his time, Arnold focused on
benefits to consumers as the touchstone of effective antitrust enforcement.124

IV. Rekindled Passion?
Richard Hofstadter famously observed that the “antitrust movement is one
of the faded passions of American reform.”125 As Hofstadter was writing in the
early 1960s, this absence of an antitrust movement was accompanied by vigorous
antitrust enforcement—an antitrust “paradox”126 he identified long before Robert
Bork altered the course of antitrust jurisprudence by articulating a different
antitrust paradox.127

118

Id. at 125.

119

Waller, supra note 2, at 102.

120

Arnold, supra note 112, at 1.

See, e.g., id. at 191–212 (recounting cases in the dairy and construction industries,
among others).
121

122

Id. at 263.

123

Id. at 260.

See Brinkley, supra note 23, at 570 –71 (describing how Arnold’s focus on consumer prices
was a shift from earlier antitrust rationales).
124

125

Hofstadter, supra note 50, at 188.

Id. at 189–90 (“In the very years when it lost compelling public interest the antitrust
enterprise became a force of real consequence in influencing the behavior of business.”).
126

Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1978).
Bork did not find anything at all paradoxical about the coincidence of increased enforcement with
absence of public interest: “The waning of fervor with the growth of organization, bureaucracy,
127
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The existence of Hofstadter’s antitrust paradox is largely due to Thurman
Arnold. He both deflated the antitrust movement in Folklore and demonstrated
a practical and effective approach to enforcement. He also tried to spark
an alternative antitrust movement of consumers, but in that he was less than
successful. Another antitrust paradox: though numerous—indeed ubiquitous—
consumers have an interest in antitrust that is too diffuse to form the basis of an
effective political movement.128 In the end, Arnold’s singular achievement may
have been to recognize that the antitrust laws were a particular type of tool—a
hammer, say—and not something else. Equally important, though, he recognized
that not every ill arising from the state of business is a nail.
One of the intellectually interesting developments of recent years has been
the attempt on the part of some scholars and advocates—the so-called “New
Brandeis School”—to rekindle a popular antitrust movement.129 As suggested by
their name, these writers take as their inspiration the work of Louis Brandeis
and hearken back to the antitrust movement of the early twentieth century.130
Like Brandeis, this school of thought is particularly preoccupied with the size
of corporations and an accompanying “curse of bigness.”131 In sharp contrast
to Thurman Arnold, the New Brandeisians have little interest in benefits to
consumers, focusing instead on broader social and political goals such as “a
democratic distribution of power and opportunity in the political economy.”132
When they list those whom antitrust enforcement should benefit, they notably

and effective power is a familiar occurrence in both secular and religious movements.” Id. at 4. To
Bork, the antitrust paradox was that “[c]ertain of [antitrust’s] doctrines preserve competition, while
others suppress it, resulting in a policy at war with itself.” Id. at 7. This paradox led to “the crisis
in antitrust,” to which he already was directing attention as Hofstadter was writing. See Robert H.
Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363 (1965).
128
See Hawley, supra note 84, at 447, 449 (suggesting that Arnold’s aggressive enforcement
program was unsustainable because of the lack of a coherent pro-enforcement constituency and
because it was “apparently destined to make more enemies than friends”).
129
See, e.g., Khan, supra note 6; Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710
(2017); Barry C. Lynn, Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics
of Destruction (2010); Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded
Age (2018); Matt Stoller, Goliath: The 100-Year War Between Monopoly Power and
Democracy (2019).
130
See Wu, supra note 129, at 33 (“This book aspires to resurrect and try to renovate the lost
tenets of the Brandeisian economic vision.”); see also id. at 34–44 (recapping Brandeis’s thought);
Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, in Other People’s Money: And How Bankers Use
It 162 (1914); Louis D. Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?, in The Making
of Competition Policy: Legal and Economic Sources 185 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert
Hovenkamp eds., 2013).
131

See, e.g., Wu, supra note 129; Stoller, supra note 129.

Khan, supra note 6, at 131; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare
Principle Imperiled?, 45 J. Corp. L. 65, 81–92 (2019) (surveying New Brandeisian critiques of the
consumer welfare approach).
132
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omit consumers.133 Nevertheless, the New Brandeisians seem to be gaining
political traction as two of their leading voices have been tapped for top positions
in the Biden Administration.134
In addition to their namesake, many New Brandeisians also look to
Thurman Arnold for inspiration.135 This is curious, as Arnold obviously was
not a Brandeisian himself.136 If it was anything, the antitrust chapter in Folklore
was an extended denunciation of the idea that bigness is a curse, ridiculing the
consequences of pursuing that idea in policy.
But nor would Arnold be in sympathy with the Chicago School orthodoxy,
which has taken hold in the past four decades and of which Robert Bork was
one of the key proponents.137 Arnold the “dissenting lawyer” would go after
this doctrine, if for no other reason, precisely because it is an orthodoxy. More
fundamentally, Arnold would find baffling the Chicago School’s seemingly
boundless faith that markets, under virtually all circumstances, will correct
themselves.138 He would no doubt find that notion as outrageously unlikely as
that city streets could do without traffic lights and traffic cops.139
Khan, supra note 6, at 132 (worrying about harms to “workers, suppliers, innovators, and
independent entrepreneurs”).
133

See Cecilia Kang, A Leading Critic of Big Tech Will Join the White House, N.Y. Times (Mar.
5, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/technology/tim-wu-white-house.html (appointment of
Professor Tim Wu as a special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy);
Cecilia Kang, Biden Nominates Lina Khan, a Vocal Critic of Big Tech, to the FTC, N.Y. Times (Mar.
22, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/business/lina-khan-ftc.html.
134

135
See Wu, supra note 129, at 51 (describing Arnold as “the Wyoming ‘cowboy’ and Yale
professor who became the New Deal’s most aggressive trustbuster”); Stoller, supra note 129, at 150
(crediting Arnold with “shift[ing] American business culture at large”).

See Miscamble, supra note 51, at 10 (Arnold was not a trust buster “in the Brandeisian
sense”); Gressley, supra note 10, at 184 (“Arnold dissented from the Brandeis opinion” on the
evil of bigness and the virtue of small business); Hawley, supra note 84, at 428 (Arnold differed
from Brandeisians in his attitude toward “the mere possession of economic power [and] the evils of
bigness per se”).
136

137
See Waller, supra note 52, at 609 (“by no stretch of the imagination” could Arnold be
considered a harbinger of the Chicago School). For a largely sympathetic review of the Chicago
School’s impact on antitrust law, see Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S.
Antitrust, in How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative
Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust 40, 43 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (arguing that “the
work of lawyers and economists associated with the Chicago School, particularly in the 1970s,
had a strongly positive effect on U.S. antitrust policy by defanging judicial decisions and policy
proposals that could have had substantial economic costs”) [hereinafter Chicago School
Overshot the Mark].
138
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 127, at 197 (arguing that “the maintenance of size against the
eroding forces of the market over a long period of time also indicates either an absence of restriction
of output or superior efficiency, or both”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 15 (1984) (“A monopolistic practice wrongly excused will eventually yield to competition,
though, as the monopolist’s higher prices attract rivalry.”).
139
See Arnold, supra note 112, at 122 (“The maintenance of a free market is as much a matter
of constant policing as is the flow of free traffic on a busy intersection.”).
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In Folklore, Arnold assessed the preceding forty years of antitrust enforce
ment and found it wanting. As it turned out, his tenure at the Antitrust Division
ushered in forty years of vigorous, oftentimes quite effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws. During those decades, enforcement efforts strayed only when they
relied on the type of “curse of bigness” mythology that Arnold had debunked.140
But beginning around 1980, things turned and over the past forty years a
new folklore has arisen, especially in the judiciary. This folklore is more
sophisticated, perhaps, than the laissez-faire orthodoxy of the early twentieth
century, but the effect on antitrust enforcement has been somewhat similar.
Antitrust enforcement has not quite fallen into “innocuous desuetude,”141
but it has been severely hampered by the judicial embrace of Chicagoinspired theories.142
Richard Hofstadter had a slightly different take from Mark Twain regarding
historical recurrence. “History cannot quite repeat itself,” he wrote, “if only
because the participants in the second round of any experience are aware of the
outcome of the first.”143 The optimism of this maxim may seem almost naïve,
as knowledge of past mistakes often does not protect against repeating them. In
any event, recalling Thurman Arnold’s puncturing of received wisdom on both
the left and right can provide a pole star to navigate these challenging times and
the struggle over the direction of antitrust enforcement. He correctly saw that
the proper focus of antitrust enforcement, if it is to be effective, must be on the
interest of consumers in lower prices and higher output.

140
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (barring merger
of two shoe companies with small market share because “we cannot fail to recognize Congress’
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business
[even if ] . . . occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets”); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (using similar
reasoning to block a merger of grocery stores with small market share); see also Thomas Kauper,
Influence of Conservative Economic Analysis on the Development of the Law of Antitrust, in Chicago
School Overshot the Mark, supra note 137, at 40, 43 (“Antitrust of the [1950s and 1960s]
reflected an almost randomized mix of economic, social, and political values.”).
141

Arnold, supra note 19, at 120.

See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)
(asserting “consensus among commentators” regarding the rarity of predatory pricing schemes
by citing Chicago School sources); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (invoking Matsushita language on rarity of predatory pricing while
adopting restrictive test for proving such a scheme); C. Scott Hemphill & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond
Brooke Group: Bringing Reality to the Law of Predatory Pricing, 127 Yale L.J. 2048, 2062 (2018)
(contending that, far from reflecting a consensus, the Chicago School literature relied on by the
Court “was contested at the time and . . . has [been] undermined” by subsequent scholarship).
142

143

Hofstadter, supra note 67, at 313.
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The issue today is whether antitrust will move in a new direction.144 On the
one hand, the New Brandeisians point toward a revived antitrust movement that
resurrects the tropes of the original antitrust movement from the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century. On the other hand, the Chicago School, though
largely exhausted intellectually, guides the judiciary and its ideas permeate
antitrust jurisprudence.145 Perhaps between the extremes of an ill-considered
revivalist movement and the continued lassitude of the Chicago School, there
is a middle way. This direction would not target bigness merely for the sake of
bigness, but neither would it assume that markets will always correct themselves.
Instead, it would aim substantially to affect business conduct in a way that benefits
consumers.146 Such is the course “that man from Laramie” would have charted.

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 583, 583 (2018) (“Antitrust in the United States today is caught between its pursuit
of technical rules designed to define and implement defensible economic goals, and increasingly
political calls for a new antitrust ‘movement.’”).
144

145
See Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 168 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1843, 1844 (2020) (arguing that the Chicago School’s “influence
has waned considerably among scholars, [but] it continues to find support among conservatives in
business, politics, and the federal judiciary”).

See generally, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker et al., Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127 Yale
L.J. 1916 (2018); Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive
Economy (2019); Shapiro, supra note 7.
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